HR 2614
Maximum Support Act
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Bill overview
The Maximum Support Act aims to bolster internet freedom and counter censorship efforts within Iran. It directs the State and Treasury Departments, along with the U.S. Agency for Global Media, to establish a task force and develop a strategy to support the Iranian people’s desire for a democratic system. The bill also proposes measures such as providing VPN services, utilizing satellite communications, restricting the import of certain devices, and confiscating assets of the Iranian government, while simultaneously working to ensure sanctions do not hinder access to technology for Iranians. Finally, it seeks to encourage defections from Iranian officials and bolster cybersecurity support for dissidents.
Key provisions
- Establishes an interagency task force to support internet freedom and counter censorship in Iran.
- Plans to provide a secure VPN service specifically for Iranian users.
- Explores the use of satellite communications and eSIM technology to bypass government restrictions.
- Addresses Iranian government restrictions on cell phone imports.
- Proposes confiscating Iranian government assets and depositing them into the Treasury.
- Includes a strategy to ensure sanctions do not impede access to internet freedom tools.
- Seeks to encourage defections from Iranian officials and security forces.
- Establishes a cybersecurity support program for Iranian dissidents.
Who is affected
- The Iranian people
- The U.S. State Department
- The U.S. Treasury Department
- U.S. technology companies
- Iranian government officials and security forces
Sponsors
Official sponsors from legislative records.
Primary sponsor
Cosponsors
Arguments in favor
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119th CONGRESS — 1st Session
H. R. 2614
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A BILL
To establish a program and strategy to support internet freedom and counter censorship efforts in Iran, and for other purposes.
This Act may be cited as the Maximum Support Act
.
It is the policy of the United States to provide maximum support to the people of Iran in their desire to bring about a new political system in Iran based upon democracy, human rights, and rule of law for all citizens of Iran.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Treasury and the CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media, shall establish a new interagency task force to support internet freedom and counter censorship efforts in Iran. In addition the Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury and CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media, acting as part of this task force, shall develop and submit to Congress a strategy to support the Iranian people in countering state and non-state actors’ efforts to create deliberate barriers to internet access, including shutting down or slowing connectivity and blocking online content protected by international human rights standards.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following:
A description of efforts to establish a Virtual Private Network (VPN) service specifically designed to enable the Iranian people to bypass government censorship and access the internet freely. The objectives of this VPN service shall include—
ensuring secure and uncensored internet access for users in Iran;
providing robust protection against surveillance and data interception by Iranian authorities and others;
maintaining high standards of speed and reliability to ensure usability; and
regularly updating and adapting the service to respond to new security challenges and censorship techniques employed by the Iranian government, IRGC and Iranian judiciary.
A description of the use of enhanced satellite communications through direct-to-cell technology and eSIM and eSIM device distribution, including—
the incorporation of services such as services that provide seamless internet access directly to cellular devices and other technology to facilitate seamless internet access in Iran; and
a program for the distribution of eSIMs and eSIM devices to individuals in Iran, enabling them to connect to satellite internet services quickly and securely.
A description of Iranian regime restrictions on the import of cell phones—
detailing Iranian government, IRGC, and Iranian judiciary restrictions on iPhone 14, iPhone 15, and iPhone 16 devices out of fear of satellite internet technology including requirements that such phones be registered with the government and the impact of past bans on such phones;
outlining steps to counter the regime’s efforts to restrict access to devices capable of utilizing satellite-based internet services; and
describing measures by the Secretary of State to curb any efforts by the regime to create secondary or black markets that would allow the Iranian government, IRGC, or Iranian judiciary or their affiliates to profit from the sale of these devices through controlled channels.
A detailed vetting plan for technology companies or individuals contracted to expand internet access in Iran, ensuring that no companies or individuals affiliated with the Iranian regime are involved in initiatives to promote internet freedom.
A description of which VPNs in Iran are built by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other entities controlled by the Government of Iran or its Supreme Leader and how such VPNs are used by the regime to surveil and monitor users, as well as a plan to counter these deceptive tactics and raise public awareness about the risks associated with regime-affiliated VPNs.
A detailed plan to support satellite-to-cell internet technology in Iran, ensuring that—
such technology cannot be censored or jammed by the regime; and
access does not require the transfer or sale of hardware that could be controlled by the IRGC or sold on secondary markets.
providing secure communication tools, encryption technology, and cybersecurity software designed specifically for high-risk users;
cybersecurity training programs for Iranian activists, dissidents, and journalists focused on identifying regime-sponsored cyberattacks, phishing schemes, and digital surveillance tactics;
rapid response technical support for individuals and organizations experiencing cyber threats or attacks; and
a system of regular evaluation and reporting to Congress detailing cybersecurity threats encountered and measures undertaken to mitigate such threats.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
Not later than 60 days after the date on which the strategy required by subsection (a) is developed, the task force shall submit to Congress a plan for implementing the strategy.
The President shall—
confiscate, through instructions or licenses or in such other manner as the President determines appropriate, funds of the Government of Iran and all agents or instrumentalities of the Government of Iran that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and
deposit funds confiscated under paragraph (1) in the general fund of the Treasury to be used for purposes described in subsection (c).
All right, title, and interest in funds confiscated under subsection (a) shall vest in the Government of the United States.
Funding may be provided to provide maximum support to persons and entities within Iran which are working for a transition to a democratic government based upon human rights and rule of law. To the extent practicable, funding must be provided to persons and entities with transparent measurable results, including through providing detailed annual information on expenditures and outcomes. In particular, funding may be provided to:
Establish a strikers fund to provide assistance to vetted Iranians engaged in nonviolent strikes and other forms of nonviolent opposition to the regime in Iran done in a way which does not materially benefit the regime in Iran.
Providing humanitarian assistance and medical supplies to the people of Iran delivered through partners that uphold internationally recognized humanitarian principles with robust monitoring to ensure assistance is reaching intended beneficiaries in a way which does not materially benefit the regime in Iran.
Establish a fund to support efforts to document and publicize gross violations of internationally recognized human rights and international humanitarian law in Iran, including efforts related to extrajudicial killings, torture, severe forms of trafficking in persons such as slavery, forced labor, and sexual exploitation, and to hold perpetrators accountable.
The funding of efforts of the task force to promote internet freedom in Iran described in section 3(a) of this Act.
The Comptroller of the United States, and the Inspector Generals of the Department of State, Department of Treasury, and USAID shall report to Congress annually after engaging in annual audits of funds expended based upon subsection(c), including whether or not the regime in Iran materially benefitted from any expenditure of funds. If the Comptroller of the United States, or any of the Inspector Generals, determine that the regime in Iran has benefited from any expenditure such expenditures must be immediately terminated, and any recommendations to prevent future diversion of funds must be immediately implemented.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop and submit to Congress a strategy to ensure that sanctions imposed on the regime in Iran do not inadvertently prevent Iranian civilians from accessing technology and tools necessary for internet freedom and open communication.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include—
An examination of existing sanctions and their impact on the availability of internet freedom tools for the people of Iran, including—
an assessment of any unintended restrictions that limit access to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), secure messaging applications, satellite communication technology, cloud-based services, and other tools necessary for circumventing government censorship; and
an analysis of how sanctions may affect the ability of technology companies and non-governmental organizations to provide services and support to the Iranian people without materially benefiting the regime.
The issuance of specific licenses and waivers that facilitate internet freedom in Iran while ensuring that such measures do not enable or provide financial benefit to the regime, including—
the development of clear guidelines for private sector entities on how they can provide internet-related services to Iranian civilians without violating U.S. sanctions;
a streamlined process for approving waivers and licenses that support internet access and digital communication tools for the Iranian people; and
measures to prevent the misuse of such licenses and waivers by entities affiliated with the Iranian government or Iranian judiciary or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or other affiliated of the Iranian government including a regular review process to ensure that waivers are not being misused by regime-aligned groups.
A plan to work with technology companies, civil society organizations, and international partners to expand access to censorship-resistant communication technologies in Iran, including—
identifying key stakeholders capable of providing secure and effective internet access solutions;
ensuring companies seeking to provide such services are properly vetted to prevent inadvertent assistance to the Iranian regime; and
enhancing public awareness campaigns within Iran about the availability of secure internet access tools.
A detailed mechanism for continuously monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of these measures, including—
regular reporting to Congress on the impact of licenses and waivers issued to facilitate internet freedom in Iran;
recommendations for further actions to improve access to open and secure communication technologies; and
an evaluation of the Iranian regime’s attempts to counteract these measures and strategies to mitigate such efforts.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
Not later than 60 days after the date on which the strategy required by subsection (a) is developed, the task force shall submit to Congress a plan for implementing the strategy.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and submit to Congress a strategy detailing steps to provide maximum support to the Iranian people in their efforts to bring about a transition to a new political system and government based on the rule of law, democracy, and human rights.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include—
A description of how the Secretary of State will—
use diplomatic efforts to support the Iranian protest movements in their pursuit of democratic governance; and
establish a Special Representative for Maximum Support including an Office for the Special Representative to coordinate U.S. Government efforts to assist the Iranian people in their democratic aspirations and to serve as a key liaison with international partners in support of this objective.
A description of how the Secretary of the Treasury will—
implement and enforce sanctions targeting key sectors of the Iranian economy that sustain the regime’s oppressive activities;
disrupt the financial networks that facilitate the Iranian regime’s terrorist activities and human rights abuses; and
coordinate with international partners to maximize the effectiveness of economic measures aimed at weakening the regime’s ability to suppress its people.
A description of how the Intelligence Community will—
use intelligence-gathering capabilities to monitor and expose the Iranian regime’s efforts to suppress dissent and target protestors;
provide support to Iranian civil society actors and opposition groups to enhance their security and operational capabilities; and
assist in identifying and countering disinformation campaigns initiated by the Iranian regime to delegitimize democratic movements.
A description of how the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) will—
expand and enhance broadcasting efforts to provide the Iranian people with accurate and unbiased news coverage on the situation in Iran;
utilize social media platforms to expose and highlight the Iranian regime’s crimes against its own people, including human rights abuses, corruption, and acts of violence against protestors; and
support independent Iranian journalists and media outlets in their efforts to report freely and counter the regime’s propaganda.
A plan for ensuring coordination between relevant agencies, including the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Intelligence Community, and USAGM, to ensure a comprehensive and unified approach in supporting the Iranian people’s pursuit of democracy.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex if necessary.
Not later than 60 days after the date on which the strategy required by subsection (a) is developed, the task force shall submit to Congress a plan for implementing the strategy.
Congress finds the following:
The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is the primary intelligence apparatus of the Government of Iran, responsible for espionage, covert operations, surveillance, cyberattacks, kidnappings, assassinations of dissidents abroad, and direct support for terrorist proxies.
MOIS provides financial, logistical, and operational support to terrorist groups already designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the United States, including Hezbollah and designated militias operating in the Middle East.
MOIS poses a direct and ongoing threat to the national security of the United States, American citizens abroad, and U.S. allies through continued support for terrorism, espionage operations, and acts of violence.
It is the sense of Congress that—
the activities of MOIS satisfy the statutory criteria for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189); and
formally designating MOIS as an FTO would advance the national security interests of the United States, strengthen enforcement against its global operations, and enhance international efforts to isolate its terrorist networks.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, shall determine, pursuant to the criteria specified in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), whether MOIS meets the criteria to be designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
If the Secretary of State determines that MOIS meets such criteria, consistent with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), the Secretary shall designate MOIS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and promptly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed justification for such designation, including an assessment of threats posed by MOIS.
Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and submit to Congress a strategy aimed at encouraging and facilitating defections by Iranian officials and members of security forces who seek to support democratic change in Iran.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include—
identification of mechanisms to securely communicate with potential defectors, including secure digital channels utilizing encryption technologies and private intermediaries;
measures providing assurances of safety and security to defectors and their families;
establishment of a dedicated interagency working group tasked with managing defections, ensuring defector safety, verifying information provided by defectors, and mitigating potential intelligence risks;
incentives for defectors who can significantly contribute to democratic change or who provide actionable intelligence about regime operations, including potential financial assistance, employment support, and housing assistance in coordination with relevant domestic agencies;
measures for publicizing successful defections, when appropriate and consistent with security protocols, to encourage additional defections within the regime; and
coordination with international partners to share best practices, jointly facilitate defections, and ensure defectors receive international protection, as needed.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex if necessary.
Not later than 60 days after the submission of the strategy, the interagency working group shall submit to Congress a detailed implementation plan for the strategy.
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a cybersecurity support program specifically tailored to assist Iranian dissidents, journalists, and civil society organizations in countering cyber threats posed by the Iranian regime.
The cybersecurity support program shall include—
providing secure communication tools, encryption technology, and cybersecurity software designed specifically for high-risk users;
cybersecurity training programs for Iranian activists, dissidents, and journalists focused on identifying regime-sponsored cyberattacks, phishing schemes, and digital surveillance tactics;
rapid response technical support for individuals and organizations experiencing cyber threats or attacks; and
a system of regular evaluation and reporting to Congress detailing cybersecurity threats encountered and measures undertaken to mitigate such threats.
Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and submit to Congress a strategy aimed at encouraging defections by Iranian officials and members of security forces who seek to support democratic change in Iran.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include—
identification of mechanisms to securely communicate with potential defectors, including secure digital channels utilizing encryption technologies and private intermediaries;
measures providing assurances of safety and security to defectors and their families;
establishment of a dedicated interagency working group tasked with managing defections, ensuring defector safety, verifying information provided by defectors, and mitigating potential intelligence risks;
incentives for defectors who can significantly contribute to democratic change or who provide actionable intelligence about regime operations, including potential financial assistance, employment support, and housing assistance in coordination with relevant domestic agencies;
measures for publicizing successful defections, when appropriate and consistent with security protocols, to encourage additional defections within the regime; and
coordination with international partners to share best practices, jointly facilitate defections, and ensure defectors receive international protection, as needed.
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex if necessary.
Not later than 60 days after the submission of the strategy, the interagency working group shall submit to Congress a detailed implementation plan for the strategy.