HR 8069
Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026
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Bill overview
The Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026 aims to enhance U.S. government coordination regarding the security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea fiber-optic cables. It establishes a framework for international engagement, strengthens the Department of State’s expertise, and improves information sharing between the government and the private sector. The bill also addresses potential sabotage threats to these critical infrastructure assets, particularly by nations like China and Russia.
Key provisions
- Establishes an interagency committee to coordinate U.S. government efforts to protect subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
- Directs the Department of State to increase engagement with international bodies like the International Cable Protection Committee.
- Authorizes the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons involved in sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure.
- Expands the Department of State’s expertise in subsea infrastructure-related matters.
- Requires the government to share information with private sector actors regarding potential sabotage threats.
- Directs the intelligence community to assess the likelihood of sabotage by China and Russia.
- Mandates a report on activities by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation concerning subsea cables.
- Establishes a process for sharing classified and unclassified information with private sector stakeholders.
Who is affected
- United States Government agencies
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119th CONGRESS — 2d Session
H. R. 8069
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A BILL
To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea fiber-optic cables.
This Act may be cited as the Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026
.
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
In this Act:
The term agency has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
The term appropriate Federal agencies means the following:
The Department of Commerce.
The Department of Defense.
The Department of Homeland Security.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The Department of State.
The Federal Communications Commission.
The Department of the Treasury.
The Department of the Judiciary.
Any additional Federal agencies, as determined by the President.
The term critical undersea infrastructure refers to both subsea telecommunications infrastructure and subsea energy infrastructure.
The term interagency committee means the entity established under section 301(b) of this Act.
The term non-Federal entity means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual, organization, or business involved in the operation, maintenance, repair, or construction of critical subsea infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure owners.
The term sabotage means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production, operation, or damage to critical underseas infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
The term subsea energy infrastructure means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, including—
to transmit electricity, including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations;
to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or offshore infrastructure; and
associated landing stations and facilities.
The term subsea telecommunications infrastructure means subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities.
Congress makes the following findings:
Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a growing threat to United States and allied security and economic prosperity.
In recent years, numerous critical undersea infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including—
in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on Earth;
in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea;
in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;
in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia;
in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the Central Baltic Sea;
in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland;
in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications cable connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies;
in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;
in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepāja and Šventoji; and
in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the Fitburg.
Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to conduct information and threat intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to protect subsea cables.
On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach.
The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network
and to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables, between ASEAN Member States
.
On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region.
It is the sense of Congress that—
critical undersea infrastructure represents vital strategic and economic links between the United States and its partners and allies;
according to NATO, undersea cables carry an estimated $10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea; and around 95 percent of global data flows are transmitted via undersea cables
;
since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East Asia;
the United States Government has an important role to play in advancing United States interests in international bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and redundancy, and advancing regulations in support of these goals;
the United States Government should play a more active role in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo-Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), in order to advance United States national security and economic interests;
the United States should lead efforts to promote the deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies and partners through enhanced information sharing and coordination; and
while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other associated private sector stakeholders carry significant responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure, the United States Government and allied foreign governments need to play a greater role.
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the interagency committee, shall seek to increase United States Government engagement in international bodies, including the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), to advance United States national security and economic interests as it relates to critical undersea infrastructure.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following:
A description of how increased United States Government engagement within the ICPC could support United States national security objectives as it relates to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.
A description of key objectives for promoting and protecting United States national security interests within the ICPC.
A description of how the People’s Republic of China entities leverage their engagement within the ICPC to further their strategic interests.
A description of how encouraging other countries and regional bodies to join the ICPC can better ensure coordinated, consistent global undersea subsea telecommunications infrastructure policies.
A description of other international bodies relevant for critical undersea infrastructure where the United States should increase its diplomatic engagement.
The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure, including—
any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly—
commits acts of sabotage; or
conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and
any foreign person that the President determines knowingly—
owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);
provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);
provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanctions;
provided documentation, registration, or flagging services for a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanctions; or
serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leadership of such a vessel or entity.
Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions.
The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:
The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.
An alien described in subsection (a) shall be—
inadmissible to the United States;
ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.
A revocation under clause (i) shall—
take effect immediately; and
automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien.
The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.
Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien to the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary—
to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or
to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
In this paragraph, the term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.
In this section:
The terms admission, admitted, and alien have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
The term foreign person means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.
The term United States person means—
any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or
any person in the United States.
The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—
a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and
a report explaining the basis for the certification.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following:
A description, with respect to the applicable reporting period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and maintenance capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation.
An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including—
a description of GUGI operations and capabilities in deep water and littoral infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and sabotage, including recent activity trends and development of new weapons systems;
a description of GUGI’s use of ostensibly civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and potential sabotage;
an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and
a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific vessels, including vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers, and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual-use operations and probing of critical undersea infrastructure.
An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), including—
a description of GRU operations and capabilities related to physical, electronic, and cyber surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure and maritime logistics;
a description of the use of Russian civilian merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a list of fishing and merchant vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers believed to be involved in surveillance or sabotage activities; and
an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions.
An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the People’s Liberation Army, the PRC Coast Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including—
a description of recent capability developments related to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and littoral purposes; and
a description of the PRC’s use of ostensibly civilian fishing, merchant, and research vessels for sabotage or surveillance of critical undersea infrastructure, including in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.
An assessment of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including—
any current or planned operational coordination against United States or allied and partner nation targets;
any joint research, development, testing, or evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare capabilities;
any technology transfers or joint training related to critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and
any coordination in procurement of advanced technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against the Russian Federation.
A list of instances during the previous calendar year in which the United States, or allies and partners of the United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia, around critical undersea infrastructure, including—
any official United States Government response to counter the anomalous behavior; and
any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and partners.
An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United States-invested cables.
The initial report required under subsection (a) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports required by subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period.
The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the assessment of the intelligence community, including dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and, if applicable, the attribution of the following instances of reported sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure:
In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard.
The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including—
an assessment of the activities of Russian military vessels, including those with undersea warfare capabilities, at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to the incident;
a description of any Russian civilian or military vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or underwater unmanned vehicles that gained access to the blast sites;
an assessment of the technical feasibility of a small group of divers conducting the Nord Stream sabotage using the rental boat Andromeda
in the weather and sea conditions present at the time;
an assessment of whether the Russian Federation’s documented practice of recruiting or coercing Ukrainians or other third country nationals to conduct sabotage operations on land targets is applicable to a maritime context;
an assessment of the fees and penalties for failure to honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or other Russian entities potentially faced due to the throttling of gas deliveries via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021;
an assessment of the insurance implications for Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and Western financiers, depending on the identity of the perpetrator;
a description of the law enforcement investigations by regional governments, the scope of their investigations, and their outcomes;
an assessment of whether any Russian vessels documented in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to or immediately after the incident, including those with undersea surveillance or warfare capabilities, were present at other suspected sabotage sites either before or after the incident in question; and
any information on potential attribution received from allied or partner nation communications through diplomatic or intelligence channels.
In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.
In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia.
In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cable and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the Central Baltic Sea.
In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland.
In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies.
In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.
In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea connecting Liepāja and Šventoji.
In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel called the Fitburg.
It is the sense of Congress that—
as international critical undersea infrastructure expands, there are increasing challenges to the proper installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of international subsea cables that have the potential to undermine United States and foreign partner national security interests;
the United States is uniquely positioned to provide technical, material, and other forms of support to international partners to enhance the resilience of international critical undersea infrastructure;
the United States Government should enhance its diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and effectively install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical undersea infrastructure; and
given the importance of critical undersea infrastructure to United States and allied energy security and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing capabilities designed to target United States and allied subsea energy infrastructure.
The Secretary of State shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards—
working with allies and partners to support the development of a multinational fleet of cable repair ships to respond rapidly to incidents of sabotage.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by the United States Government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the monitoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of international critical undersea infrastructure networks, including—
a list of current foreign policies or laws that create barriers to United States-led efforts to install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical undersea infrastructure networks; and
progress made in the previous calendar year as a result of United States engagement with allies and partners.
The Secretary of State shall assign not fewer than 10 full-time equivalent individuals, of which not fewer than 5 individuals shall be assigned to the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy to cover subsea telecommunications infrastructure, in order to support the Department of State’s interagency engagement on matters related to critical undersea infrastructure protection, including—
protection and resilience;
coordination with United States allies and partners; and
United States engagement in international bodies that cover critical undersea infrastructure.
The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy may not dual-hat currently employed personnel in meeting the minimum hiring requirement outlined in subsection (a).
Not later than 15 days after fulfilling the hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how the United States Government plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant international bodies to spur increased information sharing between allied and partner governments and relevant private sector companies on critical undersea infrastructure sabotage.
Congress makes the following findings:
According to a December 2024 Department of Homeland Security white paper, There currently exists no forum in which the full scope of the [subsea] cable industry can effectively collaborate with the U.S. government to identify and address shared challenges.
.
United States Federal Government responsibilities for the protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure, damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and emergency response are overseen by various government actors through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several Federal departments and agencies.
In order for the subsea cable industry to align with United States economic and security interests and help industry prepare security risk mitigation measures, the United States Government must provide the industry a clearer concept of operations, assessed risks to cable supply chain and infrastructure, enhanced and standardized security measures, defined lines of effort in cases of emergency, and definitive cost analysis.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency committee (referred to in this Act as the interagency committee
) comprised of the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies, to lead United States Government efforts to—
protect and improve the resilience of subsea telecommunications infrastructure;
facilitate subsea telecommunications cable licensing and permitting; and
address other matters related to subsea telecommunications infrastructure deemed appropriate and necessary by the President.
The President shall direct the interagency committee to conduct an overview of the United States Federal Government’s operational authorities for subsea telecommunications infrastructure security and resilience. The overview shall include—
an interagency concept of operations for partnering with non-Federal entities, including subsea telecommunications infrastructure owners and operators, to secure and repair subsea telecommunications infrastructure systems in a variety of crisis scenarios; and
an interagency review and action plan to streamline subsea telecommunications infrastructure licensing, funding, and permitting processes in order to promote United States international leadership in cable connectivity and deployments and risk-based prioritization and standardization of additional security and resilience assessments.
The President shall direct the heads of the relevant Federal agencies to develop strategies to coordinate closely within the interagency process and with subsea telecommunications infrastructure industry stakeholders to review subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, including by leveraging analysis from industry-wide data, to—
identify trends;
refine attributions, particularly in cases where subsea telecommunications infrastructure has been intentionally damaged by malicious actors;
identify high-risk geographic areas for subsea telecommunications infrastructure construction;
identify Federal Government functions and private sector engagement methods to support the security of subsea telecommunications infrastructure; and
inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure systems.
The strategies required under paragraph (1) shall include—
resourcing requirements;
coordination with United States allies and partners and relevant subsea telecommunications infrastructure industry stakeholders; and
the necessary technical expertise to make attributions for subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage.
Not later than 30 days after establishing the required interagency committee under subsection (b), the President shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements:
Any resources required to sufficiently staff the interagency committee and United States Federal agencies overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection (b).
A detailed plan for how the interagency committee will advance the objectives outlined in subsection (b).
Consistent with the necessary protections of classified information, the sourcing of relevant intelligence material, and privacy and civil liberties, all appropriate agencies shall, with the approval of the interagency committee and in coordination, as appropriate, with intelligence sharing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure, issue procedures to establish and promote—
the timely sharing of classified information regarding subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and any indications of potential sabotage held by members of the interagency committee with non-Federal entities that possess the necessary security clearances;
the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-Federal entities of information related to subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, information relating to indications of potential sabotage, or authorized uses under this Act, in the possession of the interagency committee that may be declassified and shared at an unclassified level;
the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-Federal entities of unclassified, including controlled unclassified, information regarding subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential sabotage held by members of the interagency committee or non-Federal entities;
the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-Federal entities, when and if appropriate, of information relating to indications of potential subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage or authorized uses under this title, held by the interagency committee or non-Federal entities about subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, in order to prevent or mitigate any potential adverse effects from such sabotage; and
the timely release of funds to meet cost, schedule, and performance metrics.
The procedures developed under subsection (b) shall—
ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage in real time to the appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent with the protection of classified information;
incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes, roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing, including subsea telecommunications infrastructure-specific information sharing and analysis entities; and
require members of the interagency committee and other appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage indicators or defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such information.
The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the interagency committee, shall—
not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit to Congress the procedures required under subsection (b); and
not later than one year after submitting such procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to Congress a report on the implementation and execution of information sharing with private sector actors in the previous year pursuant to subsection (a).